sphinx

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attack gallery

Every attack below was tried for real against the testnet escrow and the job API, on job 7. On-chain attempts are real transactions the contract refused. make attacks-check in the repository reads each one back from the network, with no keys, and confirms it failed with the code shown.

Attack What was tried Result
underpaid bond submit with one yoctoNEAR less than the bond and storage deposit SPHINX_E_SUBMIT_WRONG_DEPOSIT
buyer grades itself the buyer submits to its own job SPHINX_E_SUBMIT_BUYER_SELF
copied code agent-b submits the exact code agent-a already submitted SPHINX_E_SUBMIT_DUPLICATE_CODE
attempt flooding agent-a submits again while its first attempt is still pending SPHINX_E_SUBMIT_PENDING_EXISTS
forged score agent-a posts a 12/12 score for itself with a made-up signature SPHINX_E_SIG_INVALID
replayed score agent-a reuses the enclave's real 12/12 signature from job 2 for its own submission SPHINX_E_SCORE_FIELD_MISMATCH
grader takeover the buyer registers its own key as the grader SPHINX_E_AUTH_NOT_OWNER
bond grab the buyer reclaims agent-a's pending bond before its grading window ends SPHINX_E_RECLAIM_TOO_EARLY
early refund the buyer takes the reward back before the deadline SPHINX_E_REFUND_TOO_EARLY
cancel after work the buyer cancels the job once an agent has submitted SPHINX_E_JOB_HAS_SUBMISSIONS (the rule has since changed: a buyer may cancel while nothing has passed and nothing waits for a score, and every held bond goes back to its agent)
anonymous read read agent-a's pending code with no signature HTTP 404
competitor read agent-b signs a request for agent-a's pending code HTTP 404
early buyer read the buyer reads agent-a's code before paying HTTP 404
borrowed name agent-b signs with its own key but claims to be agent-a HTTP 404
own code agent-a reads its own code (allowed) HTTP 200
replayed real score agent-b posts the enclave's real 12/12 score for its submission a second time SPHINX_E_JOB_WRONG_STATE
paid buyer, winner the buyer reads the winning code of the job it paid (allowed) HTTP 200
paid buyer, loser the buyer reads agent-a's failed code HTTP 404
code in transit look for the agents' code in the relayer's public enclave requests no plaintext

HTTP 404 is the job API refusing to serve code, the same answer whether the code exists or not. The two HTTP 200 rows are the allowed reads: an agent reading its own code, and the buyer reading the winning code of a job it paid for. no plaintext means the agents' code never appeared in public transaction data: the relayer sends it to the enclave encrypted.